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complexity and moment as those involved in the present
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it arouses discussion, it will have served its purpose.
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SPAIN
. Battleground of Democracy
by Hubert C. Herring
The Spanish civil war belongs to the world. It is financed,
in part, by nations of two hemispheres. Its troops are augmented by volunteers from many countries. Its issues are
world issues. It points a universal question: Shall constitutional democracy or dictatorial autocracy prevail?
The attempt to localize the fight, and to prevent a general
European war grows daily more difficult. The attempt may
or may not succeed, but in a larger sense the issues in this
Spanish struggle cannot be isolated.
The purpose of this pamphlet is to remind its readers of
some of the things which have happened, which are happening
in Spain, things which bear upon the struggles of believers in
democracy everywhere.

Spain's ,C entury of Struggle
We must remind ourselves that the present struggle ;s only
the latest chapter in a century of bitter struggle.

t<Your vote must be an arrow into the heart of the monarchy"
- that was the battle-cry of the revolutionary forces in the
election of April, 1931. Spain responded, and drove the arrow
straight. Alfonso XIII fled to Paris, and the second 'republic
was proclaimed.
The bloodless revolution of 1931 was not the work of an
hour or a year. Spain's struggle for free institutions has been
fought for over a hundred years. It began in 1808 with the
Napoleonic invasion. Napoleon brought the fierce new ideas
of the French revolution; those ideas upset the old absolutism
and yielded the Constitution of 1812 which, through a national parliament, gave the people a check upon the monarchy.
But the creation of a national congress, the Cortes, did not
achieve this end. The first reform movement was suppressed
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in 1814 by Ferdinand VII, restored to the throne on the down- .
fall of Napoleon. Ferdinand tore up the constitution, jailed
the liberals, and restored the old despotism.
The history of Spain has, since then, been the story of the
struggle between the despots and the liberals.
In 1820, an army junta jailed Ferdinand and restored the
1812 Constitution. But the absolutists of Europe would not
permit such treason. The Holy Alliance-dominated by the
emperors of Prussia and Austria and the Tsar of Russia-met
at Verona in 1823, and sent a French army to overturn the
Spanish disturbers of the royal peace. Ferdinand was again
restored.
.
The bitter struggles of the Carlist wars blocked reform, but
by 1868 the feudal alliance of Crown and Church was confronted by a resolute republican force. From Paris, Victor
Hugo cheered them on: rrThe papacy and absolutism have
leagued to annihilate the nation. If Spain is reborn a monarchy, she will be insignificant. If reborn a republic, she will
be great."
Finally, in 1873 Spain actually became a republic. The
democratic forces of the world exulted. But this first Spanish
republic was prematurely launched. Divided counsels lashed
it stern and keel, and it sank within the year.
So it came to pass that the Bourbons were given another half
century of life (1873-1931), but their power was crumbling.
It was weakened bv the war with the United States in 1898.
It was shaken by the Riff campaign in 1921. It was undermined by the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera from 1923 to
1929. The indignation and the power of the people grew,
and had Alfonso not fled in 1931, Spain would have become
a shambles.

Republic Again Established
The adoption of the Constitution of 1931 represented the
fulfillment of the hopes and struggles of a century. It exuded
"the cool aroma of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Jeffer-
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son," to quote a phrase of John Gunther's. It was closely modeled on Mexico's Queretaro Constitution of 1917. The child
had taught the mother. The Constitution proclaimed Spain
to be tea democratic republic of workers of all classes."
But the proclamation of a republic and the adoption of a
constitution again settled nothing. The old feudalism remained. The village bosses - the caciques-still held their
power, the Church still controlled wealth and education, the
monarchists still dominated the army, the wealthy few still
owned the land. The republican forces, inexperienced, divided and ineffective, presented no solid front. Therefore the
reactionaries seized the very machinery which the republicans
had created, and in November, 1933 were in control of the
Cortes. Again reaction reigned . •
The clerical leader, Gil Robles, became outspoken in his
contempt for democracy. ttWe must move," he said, ((towards
a new state, and for that duties and sacrifices must be im pOJed.
What matter if it nzeanJ shedding blood? . .. We need an integral pou'er, and that is what we are seeking . ... Democracy
is for us not an end but a means to go on to the conquest of a
new state . . When the monzent comes, either Parliament will
sttbmit, or we shall make it disappear."
Under such pressure, the life of the republic rapidly disintegrated. The Lerroux cabinet set up in October, 1934, was
dominated by men whose ideas of government and social organization were colored by religious bigotry, military dogmatism, and feudal arrogance. All signs pointed to a typical.
fascist adventure in which a powerful few dominate a closeknit state at the expense of the disinherited many. The workers struck blindly, desperately, in Madrid and Catalonia and
Asturias. The revolt was put down by mercenaries from
Morocco. There were at least 2,000 dead, many thousands in
pnson.
.
1935 saw further preparations for a fascist state. Gil Robles
and his clerical group, working with the army, were preparing
for the repetition of the experience of Germany and Italy.
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People's Front Formed
But the people of Spain saw these portents - and were
aroused. In opposition to the growing fascist strength a new
coalition, the People' s Front, was formed. It brought together
a strange collection of diverse elements, middle class republicans, socialists of various hues, communists, and many of the
anarchists - all united by the common demand for constitutional democratic government. Their platform included arnnesty for political prisoners, the purging of the police force,
credits and lower rents for the peasants, protection for the
shopkeepers, minimum wage legislation, public works for the
unem pIoyed, regulation of banks, and modification of the
taxin g system.
The election of February 16, 1936 took place under the
threat of civil war. But despite wholesale corruption at the
polls, the People's Front won 268 of the 473 seats in the
Cortes. The new government took office in February, 1936.
Thirty thousand political prisoners, victims of the October,
1934 riQts, were set free.
The People's Front was not a «communist" government as
has been so often claimed. It was simply a republican government. Its one uniting enthusiasm was for the republic as
against a fascist dictatorship. Manuel Azana's Left Republicans were represented by 81 deputies; Martinez Barrio's Republican Union by 36, the Left Republicans of Catalonia by 29.
These were all typically middle-of-the-road political groups,
not radicals.
There were 98 deputies representing the socialists, but of
these fully one-half represented the more conservative socialists of Indalecio Prieto. The communists had 16 seats. It
must be made clear that at least three-fifths of the ruling bloc
were simply liberal believers in the republic.
But Spain's ccNew Deal" was not promised an-easy course.
From the start, its way was beset with trouble. It was intent
upon remaking Spain. The Old Dealers were equally intent
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upon restoring feudal Spain-the Spain in which a few people
who lived in castles owned all the land, ran all the government, officered the army - and were blessed in it by the
Church. The masses were angry and impatient. The workers
waged bitter strikes, while the leaders of the old regime
claimed reprisals through assassination and intrigue.
The issue, so sharply drawn, had to be submitted to the decision of ballots or bullets. 11he new government had already
won the contest of ballots, won it fairly and against terri.fic
odds. There was nothing left to the reactionaries save the
appeal to bullets. Hence, the coterie of obstinate generalsbacked by the princes of finance and by the Church - decided
upon bullets to regain the government.
The civil war which broke in July, 1936 is, therefore, the
latest chapter in Spain's hundred year struggle for national
integrity and democratic hope.

The Long Shadow of the Middle Ages
We must understand the things which are happening in the
light of th~ deyelopment of Spain during the Middle Ages.

The century-long revolt is the struggle of the Spanish people
to shake off the heritage of feudalism. Spain struggles to get
out of the medieval armor that no longer fits. It is no new
struggle. To remove the fetters of this same feudalism, Cromwell's army marched against Charles, Washington's colonials
besieged Cornwallis, and Paris stormed the Bastille. What
is unique in Spain is the lateness and duration of the struggle.
Feudal Spain grew out of the expulsion of the Moors, who
since 711 A.D. had dwelt in the land. Like their present
descendants, they came at the behest of one Spanish faction
to fight the government. But they graduall y gained control
in their own right. These early Moors brought a new and
higher culture. They created a prosperous Spain by vast irrigation, a beautiful Spain with skilled handicrafts, a cultured
Spain with great universities. Moorish Spain was one of the
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broad highways over which Europe traveled from the GraecoRoman world to the golden days of the Renaissance.
During this Moorish period, however, the Spanish lords
kept their strongholds in the northern mountains. Gradually
they consolidated their power in separate states: Asturias,
Leon, Castile, Navarre, Aragon. With the twin weapons of
the Army and the Inquisition, they finally swept down upon
the strongholds of the Moors. The 'Alhambra, citadel and
temple of Moorish pride, fell in 1492. With this victory the
feudal lords of Spain ushered in the most glittering and arrogant feudalism that Europe has known.
In the year that the Alhambra fell, Christopher Columbus
discovered America, claiming a new empire in the name of
their majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella. Thus Spain faced
the dual and contradictory task of completing the expulsion of
her most industrious and inventive citizens, the Moors, while
building a colonial empire which needed those very qualities
which they possessed.
The annexation of the American empire offered Spain her
fateful choice. With the resources of America to draw upon
. she might have become the workshop of the world. Spain
had all the metals and the fuels. But she lacked any deeper
incentive than the accumulation of gold for luxury's sake.
The gold of Peru was destined first to enrich the Spanish empire, and then to corrupt and destroy it.
The history of Spain in the 16th, 17th, 18th centuries is
the record of a lazy, lustful, uninventive feudalism. During
this period, Britain, France and the United States laid the
foundations for another kind of prosperity. Without easy
gold, they turned to invention and industry. With easy gold,
Spain marked time, and degenerated. Even her war machine
proved vulnerable. The 19th century saw the loss of her
empire. The process of stripping away that empire was begun
by Drake off Plymouth in 1588, and was completed by Dewey
in Manila Bay in 1898.
But the thick shell of feudalism remained even after the
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empire had been stripped away. Indeed, this feudalism remained after Alfonso XIII fled in 1931. It persisted in the
persons of those lords of great lineage and showy titles who
owned the land and the houses, and exacted toll from the
sweating millions who worked their lands. It persisted in an
arrogant Church, captained by princes of religion who lived
in houses of hewn stone and were not moved by the afHictions
of the people. It persisted in the unholy alliance between
the Church, the nobility and the rulers of business. The habits
of the feudal mind were the same under an empire and under
a republic. There was no identity of interest with the common man.
If it were to be successful, the Spanish republic must curb
those feudal powers, and bring justice to the disinherited. This
the leaders of the republic hoped to achieve, but their efforts
were interrupted by the civil war of 1936.

The Land
It is impossible to understand the Spanish struggle without
understanding the fatal injustice of her land system.

Spain, the second largest state in Western Europe, has a
population of 23,500,000. Spain's territory is about threefourths that of Texas and her population four times as large.
The primary barrier to a larger population is poverty with
its accompanying high mortality, and the primary cause of
Spain's poverty is her desperate agrarian situation. The Spaniards are the most land-hungry people in Europe. (CAll other
problems in Spain," .writes Raymond E. Crist, «fade into insignificance besides this one of agrarian reform. According
as it is or is not satisfactorily solved, millions of people either
will achieve a standard of living to which human beings are
justified in aspiring . or will continue to vegetate in illiteracy,
misery and squ~lor." Three-quar.ters of the Spanish people
are dependent directly or indirectly upon agrirulture for a liv-
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ing, but the land is distributed in such unequal fashion as to
give a decent living to not more than ten per cent.
Spain is not a fertile country. Two-thirds of Spain is a
plateau som.e 2,600 feet high, the great meseta central} surrounded and crossed by mountain ranges. In the North, the
Pyrenees and Cantabrians; in the South, the Sierra Morena;
across the plateau, the Sierra de Guadarrama, scene of an early
Verdun of the civil war.
Spain is not only mountainous; half of it is arid. The North
is temperate and moist, but the South is swept by torrid winds
from Africa. Each summer threatens the meagre crops with
drought. It is estimated that 45 per cent of the land is barren,
another 45 per cent moderately fertile, and only 10 per cent
really fertile.

Maldistribution of Land
The natural difficulties, however, do not explain the Spanish
land-hunger. The basic causes are historical and social. The
dry climate of Southern Spain confronted the Moors a thousand years ago as it confronts the Andalusians today. But
the Moors developed widespread irrigation projects, and supported a population of some 30,000,000. The feudal reconquest of Spain by the northern princes and the subsequent
wars, for the glory of Rome and the Hapsburgs, laid waste
the manpower and skill needed to maintain an advanced agriculture. By 1750, the population had fallen to 8,000,000. A
large part of the cooperative irrigation schemes were allowed
to decay, the soil deteriorated, and Spanish agriculture declined. This situation still prevails. Modern methods of dry
farming and crop rotation are practically unknown in the
Spanish countryside.
The heart of this persistent backwardness and land hunger
is the unsocial distribution of land. The great estates have
been handed down from one generation to another of the
ruling families, from the· days bf the Middle Ages.
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Modern methods and
democratic practices
are rare in Spanish
agriculture.

Dftlwings b, HelioJ Gomez

Frank Hanighen reports on the "fantastically undemocratic
system of landlordism. . .. Some 1,200 families own more
than 40% of all the agricultural land of Spain. . .. Another
20% belongs to some 75,000 families. In certain provinces,
such as Andalusia and Estramadura, over 90% of the land is
held by a few individuals. The three greatest landowners of
Spain, the Dukes of Medina, Penaranda and Alba, hold . : .
close to half a million acres. . .. These owners, it should be
stressed, are principally absentee landlords. They live in
Spain's great cities, or abroad, and either lease their land or
have it worked by bailiffs. . .. The peasant often is but the
fourth link in a chain. First, the landowner; second, the
leaser; third, the tenant; and fourth, the subtenant."

The latifundia domination in Spain is summarized in a
statement from the Foreign Policy Association: CC67% of the
land is owned by 2 % of the landowners."
The small landholders are so burdened by taxes, rents, and
feudal dues that they cannot make the necessary agricultural
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improvements. The size of their tiny plots is itself a barrier
to scientific farming. Any improvements they did make would
revert to the original owner at the end of the lease--and leases
are usually short and easily terminated. On the other hand,
the absentee landlords find it easier and more profitable to buy
more land than to develop the land already owned. Many
grandees have turned fertile lands into wasteful grazing
ranges. Thus peasants in desperate need have no opportunity
to develop the land, while the landowners find no incentive
to do so.
Even more poverty-ridden than the small peasants are the
landless peasants. There are, it is estimated, some 3,000,000
of these. In these wretched ranks are both the Catalan
sharecropper of the North and the Andalusian day-laborer on
the Southern one-crop plantations. Wages are pitifully low,
ranging from 14 to 60 cents a day. Since employment is seasonal and spasmodic, even this miserable wage is forthcoming
only during a few months of the year. The regular winter
unemployment, without public relief, brings starvation annually to agricultural workers. Even summer employment is
uncertain, for drought or rain may wipe out ·the crops. Many
families in Southern Spain live in caves and eat roots and
grasses.

Agrarian Reform
The chief hope for the relentless land hunger in Spain lies
in the division of the large estates among the peasants. The
people must be settled on the land by the government, and
means provided for its cultivation on scientific lines. There
is no substitute solution for the agrarian problem. The Catholic credit organizations functioned for years in ru~al Spain,
but while the extension of credit increased the domain of the
Church, it did nothing to appease the hunger of the people
for more and better land. On the basic question of land re. .
form, it was inevitable that the Church should stand with the
other great landowners.
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When Alfonso fled in 1931, it was clear that a suc'cessful
republican government must take steps to alleviate the condition of the peasants. Only so could it keep their support. But
the government hesitated to attack this knotty problem with
vigor. The Cortes passed laws providing for the expropriation
of uncultivated land and that belonging to the exiled monarchists, with compensation for all save feudal holders. An
agricultural survey was instituted. Yet the essential step was
not taken: the land was not divided. This played into the
hands of the Right parties, who captured the 1933 electionand prevented the division of the estates. By the end of 1934
only about 8,000 aCres had been distributed, and some 2,000
families resettled.
Not until the victory of the Popular Front in February, 1936
was the land reform program seriously launched. Between
February and July, 1936 some 100,000 families had actually
been granted land. The new government was determined to
meet the pressing need of the disinherited farm workers. Spain
started down the road taken by France in the 18th century when
the great estates were divided to provide a basis for economic
progress and democracy. She was beginning to banish the
blight of feudalism from the soil.
The attempt of clerical and fascist forces to block this road
of agrarian reform by the present rebellion may postpone the
modernization of the Spanish economy. But it is not guesswork to say that there can be no peace in Spain until the
peasants win the right to land. They are forced by their conditions of life to struggle for the soil.

The Church
'.

No one can assess the meaning of the present crisis in Spain
without understanding the role of the Church from feudal
times down to the present.

Spain is Catholic, devoutly and passionately. Evert those
who fight against the Catholic clergy are often Catholic in
conviction and feeling.
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The Church looms larger in Spain than in any other land
today. It is probable that a greater proportion of the population remains faithful than even in Italy. There are fully
100,000 clergy or members ot the religious orders. There is
1 priest to every 900 of the population, a figure to be compared with Italy's 1 to every 20,000.
The Spanish Church has always been in politics, from the
Inquisition four centuries ago to its contemporary political
movement, ,llcci6n Popular. Even its most devoted friends
will not deny the fact. Moreover, the union of Church and
State has prevailed since the Middle Ages. The union is.based
on the interlocking character of the nobility and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The princes of the Church and the princes of
the State are kinsmen by blood and by tastes.
The Inquisition, inaugurated in 1478, was the religious arm
of the monarchy in subduing the Moors and Jews. With equal
accuracy it could be said that the State was the secular arm of
the Church in suppressing heretics. This intimate connection
has persisted. The Church remained the buttress of the monarchy. This service was recognized in the paynlent of annual
tribute to the Church, from State income.
Furthermore, the economic power of the Church inevitably
tied the Church to those who would protect accumulated and
inherited power. The Church has been, and still is, the chief
capitalist, landlord, and banker of Spain. It is charged with
holding one-third of the natiop.al wealth. As the greatest landowner, it naturally has opposed all land reform. In the recurring struggles between the landless and the landed, the clerical
hierarchy stood with the rich and powerful. The landless
peasants swelled the ranks of the anti-clerical.

The Religious Orders
As an investor in industrial enterprises and as the leadingbanker, the Church opposed the organization of labor for im-·
proved bargaining status. Thus, the industrial workers learned
to know the Church as their enemy. The decisive vote of
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February, 1936 against the parties of the Right and against
such clerical leaders as Gil Robles meant one thing: that the
industrial worker was definitely anti-clerical.
The «religious orders" such as the Jesuits are responsible
for much of the fury directed against the Church. These
orders grew rich and powerful. Attempts to limit their number and wealth were defeated again and again: In 1851
Madrid entered into a concordat with the Vatican which legalized two of the religious orders by name and (tone other."
The Spanish bishops evaded this restriction by twisting it to
mean one order for each diocese instead of one for all of
Spain. The Law of Associations in 1887 required each order
to register and apply for authorization. The bishops refused.
After each attempt to curb the wealth and power of the religious orders, the regular clergy came back more powerful
than before. The orders multiplied and increased their hold,
until in 1930 there were 3,886 «communities" in Spain. Their
accumulated power) the illegal existence of the majority, and
the widespread conviction that they were working in devious
ways to propagandize for political forces aroused increasing
wrath.
The Church has always kept a strong hand on the lives of
the Spanish people. This control over their daily life went
far beyond that established by the sacraments and the confessional. The sale of indulgences prevailed down to the 20th
Century. Influential journals, such as the leading newspaper,
El Debate, have been under open or covert ecclesiastical control.
Most important has been the control of education. This
was absolute until 1857. Down to 1931, at least half of
Spain's meagre school system was in clerical hands. The cen. sus of 1930 showed 45 per cent of the people illiterate. This
compared with 4.3 per cent for the United States, and 4.2
per cent for France. The attack upon Church control of education was not primarily an anti-clerical move. It was simply
a demand for education.
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Church vs. Republic
These are some of the reasons that the most Catholic of
countries has a strong anti-clerical movement. The movement .
is not new. Churches and monasteries were burned a century
ago. But despite bursts of reform legislation in 1820, 1836,
1868, 1887, and 1901, the privileges of the Church have per- .
sisted.
The republicans who came into power in 1931 once again
took up the cudgels for reform. The measures proposed were
along the lin~s of laws adopted long ago in countries influenced by the Reformation. They included freedom of worship, separation of Church and State through disestablishment,
nationalization of Church property, State control of education,
marriage, divorce. These are not exceptional measures for a
democratic regime. Most of them are written into America's
own body of laws. But the Spanish Church threw its forces
into the task of blocking this legislation, and electing a proclerical government.
Thus little was accomplished in the first years of the Republic. Perhaps the greatest success was in the field of education. Fernando de los Rios states that during the first two
years of the Republic, .when he was Minister of Education,
10,000 new schools and 5,000 libraries were built. The program to reform the Church was, however, generally blocked
until the victory of the People's Fn?nt.
The triumph of the People's Front was won in the teeth of a
militant c1 erical opposition. .But the electoral victory merely
gave the opposition a new form and made armed rebellion
certain. The clerical leader, Gil Robles, announced the rebellion of July, 1936 four days before it actually began.
ttResponsibility," he said, "will strike the whole parliamentary
system and SEatter the very regime with mud, with misery and
blood."
This was no mere coincidence, for the evidence accumulates
that the Catholic hierarchy is openly supporting the rebellion.
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The careful correspondent of the Manchester Guardian reports, tcA few members of the clergy have either openly sided
with the forces of the republic or remained neutral during the
fighting, but they are greatly in the minority."
The support of rebellion and fascism by the leaders of the
Church does not mean that the great rank and file of the people
are anti-religious. Anti-clericalism, however, is definitely increasing. It is being fanned by those priests who have revived
the traditions of the curas guerrillefos-the «fighting priests."
Some observers believe that priests would be much safer if
they remained at their posts and threw away their revolvers,
and that churches would be in far less danger if some church
towers were not converted into machine-gun nests.
The growth of anti-clericalism is not the central issue of the
civil war. For it is clear that on the side of the loyalists there
are thousands of devout Catholics, including many priests.
The Basque Nationalists, for example, are reported to be so
Catholic that they want freedom to sign a separate concordat
with the Vatican. Moreover, the rebel ranks include not only
staunch Catholics, but also Moors, who are staunch Mohammedans, and Nazi CCvolunteers," who are Catholic, Protestant,
or neo-pagan. Democracy, not ecclesiastical reform, is the
central issue of the present death struggle.
The peril to the Church in the identification of its interests
with the rebel cause was sensed by The Commonweal, a leading Catholic journal in New York, which said editorially in
August, 1936: ccSpanish fascism will be the antithesis of the
radical social demands made by the revolutionists. Superficially it will also oppose anti-clericalism because Fascism is
traditionalistic and there is only Catholic tradition in Spain.
But it will not liberate creative Catholic energies which have
struggled to emerge during hundreds of years. Even if it
wanted to, it could not. A right social order cannot be promulgated from on top."
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The Army
Revolutions may come and go, but armies persist. The
character of the Spanish army must be appraised in order
to understand the civil war.

I t was the generals who plotted and started the civil war
which now lays Spain waste. The disloyalty of Spanish generals
is no new thing. They have a sorry record, in which treason
and reaaion dominate. In 1870, John Hay found that ««the
Spanish army from general to corporal is penetrated with
conspiracy." Three years later, to prove his words, one general turned the tortes of the First Republic out onto the streets,
and another proclaimed Don Alfonso king. The mental state
of the military chiefs has not changed in the intervening
decades. The generals were, and are, on the side of reaaion.
Hardly more than a year after the proclamation of the second
republic in 1931, General Sanjurjo launched a rebellion to
overthrow it.
In the days when Spain owned a substantial part of the
Western Hemisphere, she needed an army to police this great
empire. When the empire was taken from her, she kept the
army-particularly the officers. It was not a large army compared with contemporary European armies, but it was large in
terms of Spain's needs and resources. Its external duties were
light, for the British navy was pledged to defend Spain's neutrality. When outside duty was required, the Spanish army
proved inept. The subjugation of the Riffs was too much for it,
and proved impossible until the French troops intervened. The
chief task of the Spanish army has been to quell internal disorders.

Composition of the Army
The Spanish army is top-heavy with officers. The ratio of
officers to men is about three times as high in the Spanish Army
as in the French. It is this officer caste that gets all of the privi-
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leges and most of the pay. It is a caste drawn largely from the
ranks of the owning classes. An army appointment was the
suitable reward for the son of wealth. The army became the
bulwark of conservatism.
In sharp contrast to the parasitic officer-class is the conscripted
rank and file. The ordinary soldiers are sons of the common
. people. The graft prevalent in the upper grades has not been
shared with them. They have often been inadequately fed and
clothed. These facts are significant in view of authenticated
reports of desertion~ from rebel ranks.
The regular army is supplemented by the Civil Guard, with
some 30,000 to 40,000 men, the best trained of the numerous
police forces. It was organized a hundred years ago to fight
bandits. Latterly it has been used more often to quell the revolts
of peasants and industrial workers. The Civil Guard shares' the
army's predilection for protecting the rights of the privileged.
The army is also supplemented by mercenary troops created
to police Morocco - the Foreign Legion and Moorish troops.
These hardened veterans, renowned for their cruelty, were the
spearhead of Franco's attack, until Hitler began shipping cCblond
Moors" in substantial numbers. The colonial troops could be
trusted as the regular troops could not, because they had little
mind for politics, and because they knew how to handle grenades and bayonets. The use of these mercenaries against
Spaniards was a dangerous policy for Franco, for it aroused
resentment against the rebellion to fever pitch. The employment of the colonials against the Asturian miners in 1934 alienated large numbers from the Right parties. Their use in 1936
. was a guarantee of the unpopularity of Franco's cause.
Treason
Many republicans foresaw the threat of treachery from the
army, but they did not feel strong enough to remove the Damoclean sword by purging the army. They tried to reduce the
number of officers by offering liberal pensions. They formed a
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'"'"A Tory.controlled
arm y is perilous in a
democracy/'

new corps, the Assault Guard, to defend republican order,
which they hoped would eventually replace the Civil Guard.
The People's Front victory last February sharpened the issue.
Manuel .Azana knew that the army was full of potential rebels ~
he heard of monarchist and fascist plots. He knew this, but did
nothing more than send some of the worst reactionaries to the
colonies. Azana believed in the loyalty of Spaniards; he feared
to provoke revolt. The officers' junta was allowed to perfect
its conspiracy in army quarters and in the colonies, and to use
the armaments accumulated in government stores.
The price paid for such an undemocratic army is now only too
well known. When the generals launched the rebellion in Jul y,
they controlled the bulk of the armed forces. The defense of
the Republic rested on the workers' militias, untrained and
poorly armed. Thus far their defense has held, but at a terrific
cost. One clear lesson appears. A tory-controlled army is peril.
ous in a democracy.
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Regional Autonomy
T here is not one Spain, but several S pains. T his, too,
must be understood in appraising the present confusion.

The Spanish situation is further complicated by the fact ,that
there are within the geographic borders of Spain certain peoples
who insist upon their separateness. This is preeminently true
of Catalonia, and only less true of the Basque country and of
Galicia. Ask a man from Bilbao his nationality-t< I am a
Basque." Call a man from Barcelona a Spaniard and he quickly
sets you right-HI am a Catalan."
This regionalism which has always played a large part in
Spanish history, and which plays an important role in the present civil war, must be understood in terms of the isolation in
which the Spanish peoples have lived. Spain's mountain ranges
have not only isolated her from Europe. They have isolated
parts of Spain from other parts. They have made her rivers
unnavigable, and her roads difficult and costly. The highways
were improved by dictator de Rivera's military program, but
they are still very inadequate. The rail ways are in a chronic
state of backwardness. There is, in proportion to territory, four
times as much railroad trackage in Great Britain, Germany, and
France as there is in Spain.
The Spaniards, by and large, do not know each other. Even
today the great majority live and die in the same locality. The
exchange of people, goods, language, and customs, has not been
strong enough to fuse the regional groups into one.
The outlying regions were aroused to struggle for independence by the heavy hand of the central bureaucracy. The court
magnifice1.1ce cost money. The elaborate police machinery for
collecting the necessary tribute also cost money. And as the
external empire and its wealth dwindled, the burden of taxes
was placed more heavily on the C(colonies" within Spain. Autonomous movements on the part of these regional divisions to
lighten the load of taxation brought increased interference with
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local rights and customs. Madrid, to millions of Spaniards, became a synonym for despotism, for foreign oppression.
But today, Madrid is the symbol of freedom for the regional
minorities. Such is the change produced by the civil war. For
the provinces see Franco's troops as a new phase of ancient
despotism. They believe that the trenches of Madrid defend
regional as well as national independence. Unity with Madrid
is today the guarantee of autonomy, of regional freedom. The
old antipathies go in the face of the common danger. Thus Vole
read of strange anomalies: a Basque Nationalist sitting in the
cabinet of the central government; Barcelona factories preparing munitions for the Madril en os ; the streets of the Spanish
capital resounding with the march of crack Catalan troops.

The Catalans
The most vexing of these regional problems is that of Catalonia-tcthe Spanish Ireland," it is sometimes called. There are
more than 2,500,000 Catalans living in that Northeast corner
of Spain. The great industrial city of Barcelona is the capital
of Catalonia, as well as the chief port on the Mediterranean
The claims and prides of the Catalans are many and vocal. They
are proud of their language, a strange mixture of Spanish and
French. For centuries the Catalans have fought for the right
to print their newspapers in Catalan, to have their public schools
conducted in Catalan, and to have the courts use the regioll(l.l
language. Furthermore, the industrial economy of Cataloni .l
sets it off from the rest of Spain. Half of Spain's industry is
concentrated here.
The demand for the autonomy of Catalonia is rooted in many
centuries of independence or quasi-independence. Ever since
the eighth century, the Catalans played off French and Spanish
interests against each other, and in the playing managed to
preserve much of their own freedom. However, during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Catalan liberties were badly
clipped, the use of their language was sharply limited, and their
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·coveted autonomy was little more than a gesture of hope. Not
until the abdication of Alfonso XIII, and the establishment of
the republic in 1931, did Catalonia win anything like the status
·desired.
Under the Republic, Catalonia became a Generalidad, an
.autonomous region within the Spanish state, with full freedom
,of language, and local control over finance, police, justice, edu-cation and all social services. The reactionary government of
Lerroux, after the ill-timed revolution of October 1934, sus.pended the agreement with Catalonia, appointed a governor
,and imprisoned Luis Companys, the president of the Generali.dad, and many of his associates. Not until the victory of the
People' s Front last spring did Catalonia win her independence.
'Consequently, when the civil war broke in July 1936, the Cata~
lans stood faith full y behind the Madrid government.
I

'The Basques
The nex~ independent group within Spain are the Basques.
'There are some 1,300,000 of them occupying the provinces of
Biscay, Alava and Guipuzcoa and part of Navarre. There are
.another 200,000 of them living across the French border. Where
they originally came from, no one knows. That they are a dis-tinctly different people from either the Castilian or the French
is clear. Their language is quite distinct from either French
·-or Spanish, and has marked affinities with Eastern European
languages. The peculiar governmental and social customs of
-t he Basques were quite generally respected until the middle of
-the nineteenth century. They were permitted freedom of elec:tions, certain military exemptions; free trade and some hand
-in their local finances. But these rights were greatly limited
during the last decades of the 19th, and the first decades of the
20th century.
They won no new rights with the establishment of the republic, but with the advent of the civil war in 1936, the Basques
nave been promised the fullest autonomy by the Madrid gov-
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ernment. In spite of their social conservatism and ardent
Catholicism, the Basques support the Popular Front loyalist
government. They see in that constitutionally elected govern-ment the only hope for their ideals of autonomy.

The Galicians
The Galicians, 2,275,000 in number, occupy the northwest-ern provinces of Spain, Coruna, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra.
They too, demand autonomy. The Galicians are almost ex-elusively small farmers and find it hard to organize for common
aims. Nevertheless the Galicians are certain of the justice of
their claims to separateness. They hold serious grievances.
against the central government, chiefly on grounds of tariff discriminations which loaded heavy assessments on the grain purchases of the Galician farmer. Galicia is today in Rebel ha~ds,
but guerrilla bands of peasants are reported to be fighting for
their freedom behind the lines.

I..:abor
Today the industrial workers playa leading role.

Organized labor did not emerge as a powerful, independentforce in Spanish life until after the great war. The demands.
of war gave a sudden fillip to the development of industry in
Spain. But Spain was caught in all the bad habits of feudal
lands. Bankers were usurers, and applied brakes to anyhealthy industrial development. Employers applied oppressive
tactics. Wages were at starvation levels, living conditions-were brutal, and all efforts to organize were met with swift'
reprisals. Such conditions made inevitable the creation of a.
revolutionary labor movement. In its first phase, this labor
movement was heavily anarchistic. nDirect action" became its.
slogan. The isolated character of industry gave strength to··
the hope of successful attacks on individual factories. Also,.
the despotic character of the government encouraged such
philosophy of violence.
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In October, 1934, the
miners of Asturias
arose in revolt.

In 1910 the bulk of anarchist and syndicalist movements
were fused in The National Confederation of Labor which,
before the rebellion, numbered some 600,000 to 700,000 trade
unionists.
These held aloof from the other trade union movements
until the crisis of 1936 when many of the rank and file cast
their votes for the People's Front. Not until the civil war was
threatening Madrid were anarcho-syndicalists brought into the
coalition government.
.
Labor leaders with socialist leanings, after years of effort
emerged as powerful leaders when the republic was proclaimed
in 1931. They formed the UGT (the general union of workers) , which today has a membership of at least 1,000,000, and
probably many more. This socialist labor union is dominated
.by those of left-wing tendencies, conspicuously by Largo
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Caballero, the present war premier. The socialist party, on
the other hand, has been dominated by those of right-wing
tendencies, notably Indalecio Prieto.
The writing of new labor codes has been diligently pursued
since 1931. The results on paper have been quite promising,
but the results in performance have proved negligible. Feudalism, which has persisted both in agriculture and in industry,
resisted all change, especially the idea of recognizing union
labor. The reaction which followed on the heels of the October, 1934 revolt made short work of the unions. Many
labor leaders spent the months of 1935 in jail, and were not
released until after the electoral victory in February,' 1936.
Much of the power of the labor forces was lost through disunion. The anarcho-syndicalists of Barcelona, the communists, and the socialists used up valuable energy in cursing each
other. Not until 1936, when the People's Front won so decisive a victory at the polls, was unity achieved. The breaking
out of the civil war in July, 1936 brought these left-wing parties closer together, and it is these parties who unquestionably
furnish the effective fighting core of the present Loyalist forces .

The Civil War
All of the forces which we have outlined center in the
war which now rages.

Who are fighting, and what are the issues?
The Loyalist forces are mainly volunteer militias frorn
civilian life led by that part of the army and police which remained loyal to the constitutional government. They are
common men and women from factory, farm, and office, who
dropped their tools and took up arms at their government's
call.
They are fighting to save the Republic. They are fighting
to save the People's Front government they elected last February. They are fighting for the division of the land, for
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separati~n

of Church and State, for a democratic army, for
the rights of labor, and for regional autonomy. Above all,
they fight today for national independence.
The Rebel forces are the bulk of the regular army and Civil
Guard, led by a junta of generals, and supported by Moorish
mercenaries, the fascist Spanish Phalanx, and the monarchist
Carlists from Navarre. Behind this comparatively small but
well-trained army are powerful interests: the majority of the
Church hierarchy, the land-owners, and some of the industrialists like Juan March, the tobacco king.

Purpose of the Rebellion
Their rebellion aims to restore the old oligarchy qf privilege
by a military. dictatorship. Franco calls for ctthe establishment
()f the severest principles of authority," Y/ords redolent of the
Inquisition. The Infante Juan, 4eir presumptive to the Spanish
throne, announces that the rebellion is based upon ancient
principles of the sixteenth century and completely correcting the
false democratic ideas of the nineteenth century." A Rebel captain promises, ttWe must teach our serfs such a lesson that they
will know their place for the next hundred years."
·
This is the Rebel program. But the Spanish people have
learned through bitter experience that there can be neither
peace nor prosperity under feudalism. The ' issue is not between fascism and communism. The few communists in
Spain support the government, but they are not the government. The government is a cross-section of all those who
want democratic institutions to prevail.
The civil war is a struggle between a feudal fascism and
,democracy. The present attempt to restore mediaevalism may
turn Spain into a barren, blood-stained desert, but it cannot
-quiet the voices of liberty and democracy. Loyalist Spain is
saying, ttlt is better to die standing than live on your knees."
Not only Spaniards die in Spain. The civil war is today a
liqle world war on Spanish soil. German and Italian fascist
ct
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troops under Franco's banner storm trenches held by French,
German, and Italian anti-fascists. Russian planes clash with
Junkers and Capronis in the skies above Madrid. Spain may
yet become the Belgium of another world war.

Legal Precedent Is Broken
According to international law, a legal and recognized government is entitled to aid in subduing rebellion. The Spanish
government was elected in spite of attempts by the reactionaries to stay in power through fraud and coercion. And it
was a recognized government. Precedent, however, has been
reversed in the case of Spain. While Germany and Italy
rushed airplanes, then munitions, and then Uvolunteers" to
the Rebels, Britain and France denied aid to the Loyalists
through the (tnon-intervention" agreement. It was not until
the Rebels were besieging Madrid that men and munitions
arrived in quantities from France, Russia and Mexico to help
the Loyalists. There are many observers who think that a
little aid to the government at the outset might have ended
the rebellion quickly. But it is too late now to argue that case.
The world struggle between fascism and democracy divides
states and peoples over the Spanish civil war. Intertwined
with the conflict of ideas is the struggle for colonies, for the
Balearic and Canary Islands, for Spanish Morocco, and for the
mercury, copper, and iron of Spain. German and Italian
colonial ambitions now menace the colonial security of France
and Britain. Thus, rival philosophies and rival imperialisms
find a battleground in Spain.
The American people sense the danger to our own peace and
freedom in the Spanish war. In the interests of peace, the
United States has officially decreed a strict ban on arms to both
the Spanish government and the Rebels. If this neutrality
helps to bring about genuine non-intervention in Spain, it will
serve the cause of peace. But if it helps to establish another
fascist rule, it will be a sorry day for both our liberty and
peace.
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The United States, faithful to its democratic ideal and hope,
cannot be indifferent to the outcome of a war for human freedom. European democrats, like Lafayette and Kosciusko,
made the American struggle for independence their own. The
democracies are equally interdependent today. If peace and
freedom are to be defended successfully they must be defended
everywhere an attack is made upon them.
"
Two things at least we can do. We can study the roots and
issues of the civil war, in the knowledge that an informed
public opinion is in itself a mighty creative force. We can
alleviate the suffering by sending medical supplies, food and
clothing.
The Spanish Loyalists fight democracy's battle. If they lose,.
democracy loses. If they win, it is democracy's victory as well.
There are many citizens of the United States, reluctantly accepting the logic of the proponents of neutrality, who wish
nevertheless that the United States might find some way in
which to strengthen the constitutionally elected government
of republican Spain.

•

•

TAKE YOUR STAND
beside hard-pressed defenders of democracy in Spain.
I

Spain needs sugar, coffee, condensed milk, canned goods of
all kinds, medicines, serums, surgical and Red Cross supplies,
and warn1 clothing for men, women and children.
Send your contribution to the

NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO AID
SPANISH DEMOCRACY
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City
BISHOP

Chairman
Executive Secretary

FRANCIS ]. MCCONNELL,

REV. HERMAN F. REISSIG,

A postcard to the committee will bring you the address of the receiving station nearest you.
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Readings on Modern Spain
Books:
Behind the Spanish Barricades, by John Langdon Davies.
McBride, 1936, 275 pp., $2.75.
"The best picture now available of what is going on in
Spain."-John Gunther.

Spain in Revolt, by Harry Gannes and Theodore Repard.
Knopf, 1936, rev. ed., 235 pp., $2.00.
A study of the political and economic causes of the civil war.

T he Olive Field, by Ralph Bates. Dutton, 1936, 477 pp., $2.50.
Lean Men, by Ralph Bates. Macmillan, 1935, 555 pp., $2.50.
This like The Olive Field is a vivid novel of contemporary
life in Spain.

Pamphlets:
Spain: Issues Behind the Conflict, by Charles A. Thomson.
Foreign Policy Association, 1937, 10 pp., 25c.
Spain Under the Republic, by B. W. Diffie.
Association, 1933, 11 pp., 25c.

Foreign Policy

Spain, by American Friends of Spanish Democracy, 1937,23 pp.,
10c.
Careful reports on the situation in Spain, signed by leading
liberal American churchmen.

Spain's Democracy Talks to Ame1t ica, by North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 1936, 18 pp., 3c.
Catholics and the Civil War in Spain, by North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 1937, 16 pp., 5c.
Catholic declarations in support of the Spanish government.

Spain: Church Against Republic, by Robert Neville. Spanish
News Service, 3 pp., 2c. (Reprinted from New Republic)

SPAIN
rrOut of the murk of heaviest clouds,
Out of the feudal wrecks and heap'd up
skeletons of kings,
Out of that old entire European debris,
the shatter'd mummeries,
Ruin'd cathedrals, crumble of palaces,
tombs of priests,
La, Freedom's features fresh undimm'd
look forth - the same immortal face
looks forth j
(A glimpse as of thy Mother's .face
Columbia,
A flash significant as of a sword
Beaming touJards thee.)
rrNor think we forget thee maternal j
Lag' d'st thou so long? Shall the clouds
close again upon thee?
Ah.. but thou hast thyself now appear' d
to us, ti'e know thee,
ThaI" hast given us a sure proof, the
glim pse of thyself,
Thou waitest there as everywhere for thy
time."
-Walt Whitman
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